Amazon's Free App of the Day program, aimed at improving app visibility using daily free promotions, is a compelling experiment in the 'economics of free'. In this study, we investigate the longerterm consequences of free app promotions on the performance of apps on Amazon Appstore. In particular, we quantify the causal impact of such promotions on apps' future download volumes, star ratings, and sales rank using a multi-level model. On average, apps see a surge in download volumes during such promotions, albeit accompanied by a short-term negative e ect on its star ratings. On average, sales rank brie y improves but falls to pre-promotion levels within a few months. Our ndings suggest that lower ranked apps are the biggest bene ciaries of these promotions, as they witness the most signi cant sales impact. In addition, we show the presence of a cross-market spillover e ect of such promotions on the performance of the same apps on Google Playstore. Our results underscore a nuanced set of trade-o s for an app developer: do the bene ts of running a promotion and boosting sales rank warrant the lost revenue and risk of lower user ratings in the long run?
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones has changed the way in which we work, socialize, and communicate. One important component driving this revolution is the introduction of mobile apps, where an entire ecosystem, the mobile app economy, has been created and has grown to an unprecedented scale in just the past decade.
Today, there are four leading app stores: Google Playstore and Apple App Store, each with over two million apps; and more recently, the Windows Store and the Amazon Appstore, an app store for the Android operating system, each with over 600,000 apps . Such large volumes generate an intensely competitive environment for app developers, who are often competing for the attention of the same pool of customers. Thus, app developers, in collaborations with app stores or third party companies often advertise their products using both classical and more innovative marketing strategies. These strategies include price-discounted promotions; o ering free lite versions of their app; and o ering freemium models . However, the implications of such promotions are not clear, as each Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CS697 Submission, Boston © 2019 ACM. 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn of these options run the risk of losing revenue, to customers who would have paid full price, or would have purchased the premium model, had a discounted version not been on o er. Indeed, it is easy to nd blog posts or news discussing the negative e ects of such promotions 1 .
In our work, we examine one such promotion in detail: Amazon Appstore's Free App of the Day, both from the perspective of the Amazon Appstore and the app developers who participated. In this promotion program, on a daily basis, Amazon prominently displayed one new paid app from the app store for free download in a spot of high visibility on the store website 2 . Clearly, on the day of promotion, a participating app developer su ers short-term losses, as their app is given away for free, presumably including some customers who would have subsequently purchased the app, had the promotion not been in place. But a key selling point of this program that Amazon touts regards long-term improvement in sales for apps participating in this promotion. A primary mechanism that could drive future sales is that the promotion causes a signi cant increase in the short-term popularity of the app, which translates into improved sales rank, which in turn translates into improved placement in Amazon Appstore search results, and better future sales. The extent to which such an e ect is operative would be observable within the Appstore itself. A secondary mechanism that could drive future sales is increased awareness and word-of-mouth: the increase in brand and app awareness from a promotion could have a broader secondary e ect as new consumers are reached. This secondary e ect, if operative, would be observable both within the Amazon Appstore, but also in other app stores. A rational app developer, whose goal is long-term revenue maximization, thus has to weigh the short-term downside against the longer-term bene ts: for example, assessing whether the incremental revenue from the customers purchasing the app after the promotion and as a consequence of the promotion, will o set the revenue lost on the day of promotion, thereby resulting in net pro ts.
Turning to the perspective of the app store, Amazon Appstore's objectives behind the Free App of the Day program are complex, as the Appstore is a two-sided marketplace in a competitive market. From a market structure standpoint, Amazon is the number two player in the Android appstore market, in direct competition with the Google Playstore, the primary marketplace. But gaining market share against the Google Playstore necessitates becoming more attractive to both sides of the market: in this case, app developers and app purchasers. In some sense, attracting app developers is the easier side of the equation, as it is a relatively low-cost proposition for app developers to multi-home, and market their app in multiple app stores simultaneously. With an increasing customer base and a relatively uncrowded marketplace, Amazon can exploit 'network e ects' to attract high quality Android developers to not only publish their apps on Amazon Appstore, but also to use other Amazon cloud services in various functionalities of their app, thereby creating new revenue streams for Amazon. Here too, the Amazon Appstore's incentives are aligned with those of the participating app developers. However, attracting new customers away from Google Playstore is likely a more powerful incentive for Amazon to run Free App of the Day, as it directly increases market share and also opens up potential revenue streams for Amazon, in the form of app purchases, but also in-app purchases, advertising, and subscriptions. But building share on this side of the market may work against app developers, as doing so prioritizes short-term wins via maximizing free downloads.
Ultimately, the complex set of non-aligned objectives in a twosided market like Amazon Appstore leaves us with several interesting questions: what are the long-term consequences of participating in deep discount promotions in the Amazon Appstore? Is Amazon's promise of increased post-promotion sales a mere marketing gimmick to convince app developers to participate in the program, or does it hold in practice? What role do various app characteristics play in determining the success of such a promotion? And last, does Amazon's promotion strategy have any cross-market e ect, spilling over to other Android appstores like the Google Playstore? In this paper, we provide preliminary answers to these questions through the lens of a year-long dataset that we collected from the Amazon Appstore and the Google Playstore platforms.
Our analyses show that participation in the Amazon Free App of the Day program is positively associated with increased sales volumes on the Amazon Appstore. Higher sales also lead to increased customer reviews. However, they run the risk of attracting customers who review the apps more critically than those who paid full price, in the spirit of the Groupon e ect [10] . We show the presence of a di erential impact of promotions on di erent apps, based on their perceived quality, with low-ranked apps being the biggest bene ciaries of such promotions. We also provide evidence suggesting that extensive marketing campaigns by Amazon do leads to large word-of-mouth and social media engagements for the promoted apps, thereby creating observable spillover e ects in other appstores. Our ndings extend the understanding of the use of discounted promotions in app marketplaces. Our results will provide useful insights to app developers on how to derive maximum e ectiveness of their appstore marketing campaigns.
RELATED WORK
Our work connects to several recent streams of research in the marketing community. One line measures and models various key aspects of the app ecosystem. Notably, Ghose and Han [19] develop a structural model to estimate consumer demand for mobile apps based by quantifying their preferences for di erent app characteristics. Liu et al. [23] study the impact of freemium strategies on sales volumes and app revenues on Google Playstore, while Cheng and Tang [13] study similar strategies in software markets.
While the abundance of choices, coupled with low transaction and switching costs apps makes it di cult to tease apart the e ects of new marketing strategies like Amazon's Free App of the Day, the existing literature shows that customers in the app economy make adoption decisions based on two key factors: app visibility and app quality [1] . One e ective way to improving visibility at low cost is by being featured in lists like highest earning apps, top new apps, editors' choices, etc. All the appstores, including Amazon Appstore, populate many such lists on basis of sales rank, thus making it a key metric. Guided by the earliest work of Brynjolfsson et al. [8] in establishing the relationship between online book sales and sales rank on Amazon.com, researchers have estimated the parameters of the relationship between downloads and sales rank on various appstores using publicly available data [18] . These relationships have been used by Chevaliear and Goolsbee [14] to analyze price elasticity and by Ghose and Sundararajan [20] to study product cannibalization. These studies o er a sound theoretical foundation for hypotheses we investigate in our research.
Another line of related work highlights the economic signicance of ratings, rankings, and reviews for both online and traditional marketplaces. Luca [24] showed that a one-star increase in a restaurant's rating on Yelp results in a 5-9% increase in revenue. Researchers studying Groupon [10, 15] have shown that while daily deals websites produce a surge of new customers for retail businesses, on average, they negatively impact the reputation of those businesses, as measured through Yelp ratings. Askalidis [2] studies the impact on sales of large scale promotion on the Apple App Store and Google Play.
In addition to product visibility, product quality is an important factor during adoption decision by consumers. On the Amazon Appstore, the visibility and quality of an app are determined by their sales rank, number of reviews, and displayed user ratings. The relatively short life-cycles of apps make it di cult for app developers to build up their brands. Hence, customers usually rely on app characteristics and their ex ante awareness developed via online word-of-mouth, user ratings and reviews, while making purchase decisions. Zhu and Zhang [27] study the impact of online reviews on the sales of gaming apps, and Chang et al. [11] study the impact of heterogeneity in customer preferences while making purchase decisions. We employ a similar methodology to these works to ascertain the presence of a similar heterogeneity in the impact of promotion based on the consumer biases in perceived app quality.
Lastly, our study also relates to studies of spillover e ects. For example, Erdem and Sun [17] empirically study the cross-category spillover e ects of advertising in umbrella brands However, we know of no similar study that empirically observes cross-market spillover e ects.
DESIGN OF EMPIRICAL STUDY
The Amazon Appstore for Android is a third-party appstore for the Android operating system, operated by Amazon.com. It was launched in March, 2011 and is now available in nearly 200 countries. At the time of the launch it had about 3,300 apps; the number has increased signi cantly since then to nearly 334,000 apps at the time of this study. Similar to Amazon.com, the appstore apps are sold via two channels -website interface and a smartphone app. Amazon.com o ers the same selection of apps over both its channels. Because we are unable to distinguish the app downloads over the website channel from the ones over the smartphone app, we are limited to identifying the e ects of only the app characteristics that are common to both the channels.
Free App of the Day Promotion
One of the most high-pro le features of the Amazon Appstore for Android is the Free App of the Day, or FAD. The primary bene t for the apps participating in the FAD promotion is a spot of very high visibility, on both the channels. Along with it, Amazon uses its marketing machinery to promote the participating apps by making Facebook posts or tweets on their o cial Twitter account. As these posts get picked up by various bloggers and other such platforms, the promotion is only further ampli ed. The bene ts of the promotion continue long after the the app's time in FAD spotlight is over at the end of the day. It nds a spot in the 'Most Recent Free Apps of the Day' shoveler on both channels. In addition to the increased direct visibility, the app continues to get post-FAD exposure throughout the appstore due to Amazon's recommendation system. Because of the increase in app downloads typically associated with FAD, the promoted apps show up on the product details pages of other apps under the 'Customers Who Bought This Item Also Bought' feature. An increase in app downloads also translates into a higher 'Amazon Bestsellers' list, further improving post-FAD exposure.
App Selection for Promotion
An interesting feature of the Free App of the Day is that the promoted apps are selected by Amazon from proposals submitted by developers themselves. Some of the factors taken into account while evaluating proposals are the appeal of the app to wide audience, size of the app, number of downloads, plans for marketing outside the appstore, etc. 3 Robustness checks which address the resulting bias from self-selection appear in the full version [12] .
Data Description
In this section, we provide an overview of the major datasets used in our analysis: Amazon and Google appstore data, and FAD promotion history.
3.3.1 Amazon Appstore Data. We collected app pro le data from the web interface of Amazon Appstore, while relied upon a thirdparty Amazon price tracker website Keepa.com for collecting daily price and sales rank of every app, from February, 2015 till December, 2015. It includes 23,882 distinct apps from the paid apps sections of the appstore. For every app, we further collected the entire history of publicly displayed user reviews, including submission date, review text, and star-rating, constituting a total of 800,000 user reviews. Thus, our dataset includes daily panel data on app sales rank, price, app characteristics and user review data. We capture an exhaustive list of app-related information provided to a user while browsing through the appstore. The observed app characteristics in our sample include app le size, release date, version, textual description, in-app purchase option, number of screenshots, number of permissions, maturity level, category, developer, minimum Android version supported by the app and number of apps provided by the same app developer.
FAD Promotion History.
In order to obtain the FAD promotion history, we relied on Amazon Appstore's o cial Twitter account. Amazon used this account to daily inform its followers about which app was being promoted. There were 794 promoted app over a period of almost two year, from July 2013 to August 2015. To minimize confounding e ects of multiple promotions on our analysis, we remove the apps promoted in our observation period, which had already been promoted in past. Thus, for the remaining 179 distinct apps, that participated in FAD promotion exactly once, we record their date of promotion.
Combining Amazon Appstore data with FAD promotion history, we present relevant summary statistics in Table 1 with 'Treatment' apps corresponding to the ones participating in FAD promotion. More detailed summary statistics are available in [12] .
3.3.3 Google Playstore Data. We used techniques from image classi cation and text similarity to help nd likely cross-listed FADpromoted apps on the Google Playstore. Out of the original 794 FAD promoted apps, we found 720 very high-con dence matches. Due to the sheer volume of apps on the Google Playstore, Google does not maintain a sales rank across the entire appstore, only choosing to do so at a subcategory level. From publicly available data on AppAnnie.com and AppBrain.com, we collected sales rank history of 566 of the FAD promoted apps, across 52 di erent subcategories. In addition, we also collected a total of 480,000 publicly available user reviews and meta-data for these apps.
Hypotheses
Existing literature in economics and marketing science predicts that the consumers use external information to supplement their ex ante awareness of products while making purchasing decisions [16, 21] . Amazon's FAD promotion, lowers the cost incurred by the consumers when searching for external information regarding promoted apps, and is thereby expected to a ect sales patterns [9] . In this section, we will formulate our hypotheses on how the Amazon's FAD promotion can lead to changes in apps' sales rank and user ratings patterns.
3.4.1 Impact within Amazon Appstore: Amazon's FAD promotion is a unique kind of recommendation tool, that not only provides the product for free, but also decreases the search costs drastically by providing 'directed' links, that take consumers directly to the product pages on the appstore. We hypothesize that such promotions may lead to sales trends with exceptionally high weights for the promoted apps. At the same time, in the spirit of the 'Groupon e ect' studied by Byers et al. [10] , we hypothesize that FAD promotion runs the risk of attracting consumers who review the promoted apps more negatively than those who purchase the same apps at full price. Hence, impacts of FAD promotion on longer-term sales and ratings is the central research question studied in this paper. Now, while describing the various variables from our data, we provide brief theoretical explanation of how they play an important role in the analysis of our hypothesis. The le size of the apps tends to increase with increasing sophistication and utility, leader to larger download times. Users can incur higher data costs for downloading such apps. This is not only one of the factors in uencing Amazon's choice of FAD promoted apps, but may also impact the number of downloads during promotions, even if the users do not have to pay for the app itself. We use the app release date to track the age of an app. As the app gets older, its sales rank tends to increase while average user rating decreases. Furthermore, Amazon prefers to promote relatively newer apps. To maximize the usable variation in di erent time-variant variables in our dataset, we aggregate them at a monthly frequency, with respect to app age in months. App developers periodically release new versions of their apps to introduce new features or in response to user feedback. Thus, the number of versions of an app is likely to be an indicator of its quality and functional maturity, both of which a ect app demand and user ratings 4 . Detailed analysis explaining rationale behind including each variable is provided in the full version of the paper [12] .
Cross-Market Spillover:
In the app economy, consumers are more likely to be aware of popular apps across di erent appstores, than niche apps speci c to their primary appstores i.e., Apple iTunes or Google Playstore. This is because, social media and technology bloggers serve as external sources of information, and play a key role in setting trends for popular apps, as evident in the example of Pokemon Go, a virtual reality based smartphone game [3] . We believe that FAD promotion can improve ex ante awareness for promoted apps among the users of Google Playstore via advertising and word-of-mouth referrals. In fact, Amazon's marketing strategy ensures that consumers can actively perform speci c searches on Google Playstore using exact app names. These types of speci c searches, or "directed searches" [25] , take consumers directly to the app pro le page, helping them quickly locate it. As a result, we hypothesize the presence of a cross-market spillover e ect of FAD promotion on the Google Playstore, on the sales rank of promoted apps. On the other hand, while installing a FAD promoted app, the consumers on the Google Playstore make full priced purchases, and are unlikely to be 'experimenting' like their Amazon counterparts. Hence, we do not expect these consumers to leave overly critical user reviews for their purchases. Consequently, we do not expect presence of a strong cross-market spillover e ect on user ratings of the promoted apps.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In this section, we specify the 'within-between' formulation of the multilevel models [5] to estimate the causal impact of the FAD promotion on the sales and user ratings' patterns of the promoted apps. In this study, we create a longitudinal dataset by tracking sales rank and review history of many apps over several months. Hence, our study has a hierarchical structure -repeated measurements at level-1, nested individual apps at level-2, which are further nested into separate categories at level-2. An alternative is a Fixed E ects (FE) approach, but this limits the e ects that can potentially be studied, as they introduce dummy variables corresponding to higher levels of measurement in the hierarchical structure. In the full version of the paper, we show that the primary e ects we identify in the Multilevel case are similarly present (with nearly identical magnitudes) in FE models.
Model Speci cation
Because the apps participating in the FAD promotion (treatment apps) were promoted on di erent days in our observation period, we have a multiplicity of "experiments" to exploit. Our empirical approach relies on contrasting the change in sales rank and user ratings of the treatment apps in a given period with those that did not get promoted in the same period (control apps).
We adopt an individual growth model or level-1 submodel that incorporates the linear change in sales rank with respect to age of an app. Following the within-between model from Bell and Jones [5] , we also introduce the app-level mean and the centering term for age, a time-varying covariate, to separate the 'within' and 'between' e ects of the variable, necessary for causal interpretation.
FAD promotion, lasting for exactly a day, acts as an intervention for the treatment apps, and introduces an abrupt discontinuity in the trajectory of app's sales rank (or user rating) over time. To postulate a post-promotion change in trajectory, we include a timevarying predictor, After i j in the level-1 submodel that speci es whether and, if so, when each app experiences the discontinuity. Before an app i is promoted, After i j = 0, and if and when, it gets promoted, After i j becomes 1. We stipulate that level-1 residuals are drawn from an underlying normal distribution, ϵ i j ∼ N (0, σ 2 ϵ ).
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where Age i j is a (series of) time-variant value for app i. Because After i j distinguishes the pre-and post-promotion epochs for app i, the growth parameter π 2i captures the magnitude of the instantaneous impact of promotion by permitting a discontinuity in the intercept of the trajectory. To create a post-promotion trajectory, that di ers in slope, we include another predictor Post i j which clocks age of an app from the day of its promotion. Before an app i is promoted, Post i j is 0. On the day the app is promoted, Post i j remains at 0. However, after that, its values begin to increase in concert with the primary temporal predictor, Age i j . It is worth noting that because timing of promotion is app-speci c, the cadence of Post i j is also app-speci c. Finally, we model the curvilinear change in trajectory post-promotion by adding Post 2 i j . The level-1 submodel become, Sales Rank (L) i j = π 0i +π 1i Age i j +π 2i After i j +π 3i Post i j +π 4i Post 2 i j +ϵ i j (2) While the level-1 submodel describes how each app changes over observational period, the level-2 submodel we now de ne describes how those changes di er across apps [7, 26] . To do so, we introduce app-level means of the time-variant variables while modeling the intercept term. If we let X i be a vector representing the time-invariant app-speci c characteristics, then we can simply include them in the level-2 submodel without the risk of introducing collinearity: π 0i = γ 00 +γ 01 Age i +γ 02 After i +γ 03 Post i +γ 04 Post 2 i +αX i +ζ 0i (3) where Age i and After i are the app-level means; as such, the timeinvariant component of Age i j and After i j respectively 5 . After combining both the levels of the multi-level model, and some algebraic simpli cation, we can express a composite model as follows, Sales Rank
where π 5 = γ 01 −π 1i , π 6 = γ 02 −π 2i , π 7 = γ 03 −π 3i and π 8 = γ 04 −π 4i respectively. Residuals at both levels are assumed to be Normally distributed: ϵ i j ∼ N (0, σ 2 ϵ ) and ζ 0i ∼ N (0, σ 2 0 ). Heteroscedasticity at the level-1 is explicitly modeled by including additional level-2 submodel.
The residuals part of the composite model now becomes (ϵ i j + ζ 0i + ζ 1i × Age i j − Age i ). This reveals two important properties about level-1 residuals: they can be both autocorrelated and heteroscedastic within-app. Like level-1 residuals, we make an assumption that level-2 residuals have an underlying bivariate normal distribution. Now, π 2i is the 'within' e ect and π 6 is the 'between' e ect of the FAD promotion [4, 22] . We further extend it by modeling π 2i on level-2 to include app-speci c time-invariant characteristics. This enables us to model and quantify the e ect (if any) of app-speci c characteristics on the impact of FAD promotion.
We sequentially introduce and compare estimated xed e ects and variance components to identify which predictors explain most variation. Similarly, we drop variance and covariance terms when the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, for example, in Equation 6 . Because the sales rank and user ratings data is observed at a high frequency, serial correlation is a major concern. Following the recommendations of Bertrand et al. [6] , throughout our analysis, we compute standard errors using the generalized Huber-White formula clustered at app level. This allows for arbitrary error correlations among the daily sales rank or user ratings observations.
Heterogeneous Impact of Promotion
Consumers downloading apps from Amazon Appstore do not make purchase decisions solely based on the price and the app characteristics which are xed by the app developers; but they may use pre-existing biases or develop some regarding the quality of the apps based on the user reviews and sales ranks of the apps before the day of promotion. For example, we believe that two apps which o er the same core functionality may well experience very di erent impacts of FAD promotion, if their sales ranks and user ratings are di erent. Therefore, to check for such a heterogeneity of impact of promotion, we adopt a very conservative de nition of "app quality" by segregating the promoted apps into three rank categories based on their average sales rank through our observation period. Apps with average sales rank in the rank 1 to 1984 form Rank Category 1, 1985 to 4573 form Rank Category 2 and the rest form Rank Category 3. To each of these rank categories, we add the control apps whose average sales ranks lie within the category boundaries. Finally, we introduce these rank categories as time-invariant variables in the model from Equation 4 in order to study the heterogeneity of FAD impact.
Cross-Market Spillover
As we do not have access to the data for control group of apps on the Google Playstore, we cannot specify a model that provides causal inference regarding cross-market spillover e ect of FAD promotion. Hence, our model aims at identifying the correlational e ects of FAD promotion and sales rank trends on the Google Playstore. Unlike the impact of FAD promotion on Amazon Appstore, we do not expect a longer duration impact on the Google Playstore. Hence, to maximize the usable variation, we code various variables at weekly frequency. Because each app is promoted on a di erent day on the Amazon Appstore, we create a categorical variable, Interval i j that measures the o set in weeks from the day of promotion, for app i. This allows us to model the spillover e ect as follows, Sales Rank
where we have included xed e ects for each app, each week, as well as an interaction between the two. Similar to the previous model, we compute standard errors using generalized Huber-White formula, clustered at app level.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our empirical analysis focuses on four main questions:
• What is the impact of FAD promotion on the sales rank, number of reviews and user ratings of the promoted apps on Amazon Appstore?
• Do the time-invariant app characteristics of the promoted apps have an e ect on the potential impact of FAD promotion?
• Is there a heterogeneity in the impact of FAD promotion based on 'quality' of the promoted app?
• Is there a cross-market spillover e ect of FAD promotion on Google Playstore?
Impact of FAD promotion
In this section, we provide a formal analysis of tting the model from Equation 4, with estimates reported in Table 2 . The co-e cient of the After variable quanti es the immediate impact, experienced during the day of promotion, while co-e cients of Post and Post 2 variables help us better understand the longer term impact by describing the shape of the post-promotion trajectory of the dependent variable. We nd that FAD promotion causes a 25% improvement immediately. However, post promotion, the sales rank starts falling at a signi cantly faster rate than it would have in the absence of any promotion. Comparing the co-e cients of Post and Post 2 variables, we observe that it takes around 3-4 months for the rate of fall of sales rank to stabilize to its pre-promotion rate.
To estimate whether the improvement in sales for a small period after the promotion is enough to o set the losses sustained due to free give-aways of the app during promotion, it is important to know the exact parameters of the Pareto distribution relationship between sales rank and actual sales volume. Estimating these parameters is beyond the scope of this study due to unavailability of actual sales data. Our analysis provides a framework to easily evaluate the net developer revenue, given these parameters. However, it should be noted that a net negative developer revenue does not always mean that a developer would su er losses. Without conducting a counter-factual experiment, it is likely that we would overestimate the revenue lost at the time of promotion as it is impossible to know how many customers who downloaded the app for free would have otherwise purchased the app at its full price and contributed to the lost revenue.
Consistent with the sales rank trend, we observe that FAD promotion causes an abrupt 18-fold increase in the number of monthly reviews. Similar to sales rank, the number of monthly reviews keeps decreasing until after 4-5 months, at which point they stabilize to the pre-promotion values. However, consistent with our hypothesis, we nd that the increased downloads in the month of promotion and subsequent abrupt increase in user reviews is achieved at a cost of a signi cant decrease in the average star rating. FAD promotion causes an abrupt decrease of 0.16 stars immediately after promotion, and increases the overall rate of decline of star ratings by up to 0.01 stars more every month.
We o er two potential explanations for the decline of star ratings: this could be because the users who download apps during FAD promotion are more likely to be experimenting with new apps. Such users may install an app simply because it is free, notwithstanding their actual needs, and review the app with low rating due to the app's perceived inability to impress them. An alternative explanation is o ered via anecdotal evidence 6 . In case of apps that provide services via cloud infrastructure, the overwhelming increase in app usage during promotion may lead to poor quality of service due to inadequate resources, resulting into dissatis ed users who leave critical reviews with low star ratings.
Observing the co-e cients of the interaction terms, we nd that some of the app-speci c time-invariant characteristics a ect the e ectiveness of the FAD promotion. A 10% increase in app size results in 1.42% fall in the post-promotion immediate sales rank and a 1% fall in the number of monthly reviews in the month of promotion. One extra screenshot in the app pro le page improves the sales rank immediately after FAD promotion by 4.5%. Similarly, a 10% increase the length of textual description also improve the e ectiveness of FAD promotion by up to 2%. While the price of the app or presence of in-app purchase options within the app signi cantly a ect the general trends on Amazon Appstore, they do not seem to a ect the e ectiveness of FAD promotion.
While our results provide insights into the impact of FAD promotion, they do not provide a conclusive answer whether an app developer should participate in a FAD promotion. Nevertheless, our analysis reveals that FAD promotion positively impacts sales ranks and the volume of reviews of the promoted apps comes with a cost of signi cant decline in star rating, underlining a nuanced set of trade-o s for the app developers.
Heterogeneous impact of FAD promotion
For brevity, we present only a visual summary of the heterogeneity in the impact of FAD promotion across rank categories in Figure 1 , deferring analytical results to the full version [12] . In this gure, we plot the means of estimated dependent variables for each of the rank categories at 30-day intervals for ve months prior through six months after the FAD promotion. The dashed lines in each gure represent robust 95% con dence intervals for each point estimate. The rst row of Figure 1 shows that apps belonging to all rank 6 https://blog.shiftyjelly.com/2011/08/02/amazon-app-store-rotten-to-the-core/ categories experience an improvement in their sales rank during promotion. Moreover, the bottom third of promoted apps are the biggest bene ciaries of the promotion -they recoup substantial bene ts for a longer duration as compared to the top third, which receive a minimal bene t for a shorter duration. The second row, depicting impact on the number of reviews further reinforces this result. Bottom third apps experience a larger increase in the number of monthly reviews as compared to the upper two thirds. However, they also (problematically) experience the most signi cant decline in star ratings, as evident in the third row of Figure 1 . From the perspective of a developer, it may be surprising that low ranked apps appear to be the biggest bene ciaries of promotion in terms of downloads. We speculate that the popular top apps have already captured market share and thus have less potential to attract new customers than relatively unknown low ranked apps. At the same time, low ranked apps are of poorer quality on average, and their exposure to a wider audience via promotion leads to many more critical reviews, and the subsequent steep decline in star ratings.
Analysis of the heterogeneous nature of the impact of FAD promotion allows us to look at the question of participation in FAD promotion in a more nuanced manner. It is evident that top app developers experience an increase in the number of downloads with close to no decline in star ratings, while the developers of the bottom ranked apps, notwithstanding the decline in star ratings, bene t more in short-term pro ts. For developers belonging to either of these categories, the improvement in sales through FAD promotion may outweigh the risk of long-term damage to the app reputation. However, the developers of the apps in middle category face a di cult tradeo as to whether to prioritize short-term pro ts or long-term app reputation. 
Cross-Market Spillover
We now consider the impacts of spillovers from FAD promotion on the Amazon Appstore to other appstores, namely Google. As described in Section 3.3.3, due to a large volume of apps, Google does not publicly display a uniform sales rank for every app across the entire appstore, choosing to do so only at the level of categories. Unfortunately, this limits our ability to quantify the magnitude of the cross-market spillover, as we cannot normalize the e ect of FAD promotion across di erent subcategories without detailed information regarding app downloads for all apps. For brevity, we provide a visual summary of the cross-market spillover e ect of FAD promotion on Google Playstore in Figure 2 , obtained by tting the model from Equation 7. We plot the estimates (β 1 ) for the categorical variable Interval which represents the o set in weeks from the day of promotion of an app on the Amazon Appstore along with a 95% con dence interval. We see evidence of an improvement in the categorical sales rank in the week of promotion, supporting the hypothesis of a cross-market spillover e ect. The e ects seems to last for a few weeks after the FAD promotion. One should not make strong inferences from this gure, however, for the reasons described above. Moreover, due to absence of control apps in the dataset, we cannot demonstrate a causal relationship between the FAD promotion and the observed e ect. Nevertheless, we believe that the presence of such a striking trajectory of sales rank for di erent apps that are promoted on Amazon Appstore, exactly in the week of promotion, is likely a strong indicator of cross-market spillover and warrants further examination. This cross-market spillover e ect is also supported anecdotally, e.g., the statistics provided by the developer Tasharen Entertainment in their blogpost detailing their experience during FAD promotion 7 .
Although, we do not provide causal evidence supporting the cross-market spillover e ect, our analysis and anecdotal evidence strongly supports the presence of such an e ect. A plausible explanation of this spillover e ect is that Amazon's aggressive marketing of the promoted apps is an attempt to attract new users to Amazon Appstore. However, after the end of FAD promotion, users who become aware of the promoted app perform 'directed searches' of the app names on their primary appstore i.e., Google Playstore to download the app, instead of downloading Amazon Appstore app 7 http://www.tasharen.com/?p=4664 and then purchasing the app over it. In future work, we propose to explore whether spillover e ects on Google Playstore mirror those on Amazon (i.e., improved sales rank but lower ratings).
CONCLUSIONS
Appstores, like most traditional and online market platforms, are dominated by a few best-selling apps, with the long tail of other apps competing for visibility and attention of customers. However, in case of appstores, the absence of operational costs associated with inventory management, and the relative ease of running large scale online advertising campaigns has given rise to innovative marketing strategies. In this paper, we have examined a number of hypotheses to analyze the impacts of deep discounted promotions in the app economy. While there remain challenges to building a predictive model that could quantify the expected costs and bene ts of such promotions, our modeling framework and empirical measurements provide a signi cant rst step.
Our empirical results presented in Table 2 highlight that on average, all apps promoted in the Amazon Free App of the Day program experience a signi cant immediate improvement in the sales on account of improved visibility. However, the long-term e ects of such a promotion strategy depend on the quality of the app. The improvement in the post-promotion sales volumes may not be sustained long enough to o set the lost revenue on the day of promotion, especially for the top apps. App developers should be cognizant that promotions lead to an abrupt increase in engagement of the users in form of reviews (both positive and negative), and on an average, cause negative impact on the reputation of app.
For appstores, long-term success depends on the satisfaction of both customers as well as app developers. There needs to be a complex trade-o between providing users with quality apps at low price, while at the same time mitigating potential losses to app developers' reputation and pro ts. Existing incentives to provide higher app visibility is most attractive to lower-ranked apps. Such practices may yield gains in market share for a short-term, but inhibit long-term customer retention.
Last, but not least, we nd that increased app visibility on account of promotion increases brand awareness due to social media and word-of-mouth engagements. This e ect not only drives future sales on the primary appstore i.e., Amazon Appstore, but also spills over across the markets onto other appstores like Google Playstore. This adds an additional complexity in measuring the true impact of promotions on the revenues of app developers. Indeed, a rational app developer should weigh the incremental revenue from across di erent appstores against short-term reputation damages, while assessing the merits of promotion.
Our ndings contribute both to the academic literature and give guidance to practitioners in the mobile app marketplace. Our study contributes to the growing body of research that utilizes publicly available e-commerce data to empirically validate research questions. It extends the existing knowledge about promotion strategies in the app marketplace, while also validating existing theories about consumer behaviors during discounted promotions. Finally, for app developers, our study provides insight on in uential factors and determinants of successful marketing strategies.
